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GROUPING THE MARCELLUS PAYOUT:  USE OF CLASS 
ACTIONS IN ROYALTY LITIGATION CONCERNING 
POST-PRODUCTION COST DEDUCTIONS 
KAREN E. KAHLE* AND DENIELLE M. STRITCH** 
ABSTRACT 
 
As drilling and operations in the Marcellus, Utica, Bakken, and other 
United States shales increase across the country, so naturally does litigation 
between those owning the land and minerals, and those producing them.  
This Article will outline the growing trends that entitle lessors to royalties 
without any deduction of production or transportation costs, as well as the 
parallel application of these principles to establish commonality for class 
certification of lessors.  Regardless of the differences between drilling, 
leases, and pooling agreements in the shale context, Appalachian 
jurisdictions are likely to hold the course and continue examining royalty 
issues, and class certification of those issues, as liberally as they have in 
other contexts.  Part II of this Article will address royalty payments and cost 
deductions in state courts through the present, focusing on how courts have 
handled similar disputes in the past.  Part III of this Article will outline the 
general processes needed to certify a class.  Part IV will examine the 
commonality requirement of class certification more thoroughly, and Part V 
will review that commonality requirement in the context of landowner 
royalty disputes.  Part VI of this Article will examine how courts have 
addressed contract-based class actions.  Finally, Part VII will argue that as 
landowner, royalty, and cost deduction disputes arise in the context of the 
shales, courts are likely to apply the implied covenant to market against any 
lessee and find commonality where leases bear similar language, subjecting 
the lessee to such a covenant. 
  
 
* Karen E. Kahle is a Member of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, where she has practiced as a 
litigator, primarily in West Virginia and Ohio, for the past twenty-two years. 
** Denielle M. Stritch is an Associate of Steptoe & Johnson PLLC, also practicing in the 
litigation department throughout West Virginia. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the Appalachian states have seen remarkable growth in 
natural gas drilling in the Marcellus and Utica shales. These shales are 
geological formations of accumulated sediment, buried millions of years 
ago and compressed to produce the shale.1  It is well known that the 
Marcellus is rich in fossil fuels, but until technology caught up with desire, 
there was no practical way of accessing the natural gas trapped within this 
formation.2  However, with the advent of technology came the ability to 
access, produce, and profit from the natural gas in the Marcellus.3  A 
similar “rush” is underway with the Utica shale, another gas, and potentially 
oil rich, shale formation located on the western side of the Appalachian 
Basin.4  Similar to the Utica and Marcellus shales, the Bakken shale, 
located largely in North Dakota, and other various shale formations 
throughout the country, are experiencing similar “rushes.”5  As shale 
production and leasing activities increase, courts are likely to see an influx 
in issues not previously addressed in-depth.  Because of these changes in 
extraction in the shales, new twists on legal issues as to ownership and 
royalty rights are cropping up more often.  Oil and gas companies are 
seeing new problems arise in their leasing structures, practices, production 
methods, and royalty payouts.  Landowners are clashing with these 
companies in new and unique ways. 
One particular area courts are likely to be pulled into battles between 
landowners (lessors) and drilling companies (lessees) is royalty payment 
calculations and post-production cost allocation.6  In particular, landowners 
are bringing more claims alleging that lessees are engaging in a common 
pattern of miscalculating the royalty payments owed under leasing 
agreements, which are often payments under pooling agreements.7  These 
 
1. See Kristen Allen, The Big Fracking Deal: Marcellus Shale – Pennsylvania’s Untapped 
Resource, 23 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 51, 54 n.26 (2012). 
2. See id. at 54-55. 
3. See id at 55. 
4. See generally Stephanie Karisny, Hydraulic Fracturing in Michigan:  Reassessing State 
Regulations in Light of New Drilling in the Collingood and Utica Shales, 57 WAYNE L. REV. 627 
(2011). 
5. See Christopher S. Kulander, Environmental Effects of Petroleum Production:  2010-2011 
Texas Legislative Developments, 44 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 863, 881 (2012) (“The problems being 
heard by the Eagle Ford Task Force are analogous to another shale gas boom currently underway 
in remote and sparsely populated western North Dakota wherein the Bakken Shale is found.”).  
See generally Karisny, supra note 4. 
6. See infra Part II.E. 
7. Randy M. Awdish, Wolverine Gold Rush?  A Primer on the Utica/Collingwood Shale and 
Gas Lease Issues, 38 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 64, 70 (2011) (“A typical lease will contain a 
provision allowing the lessee the right to consolidate or ‘pool’ the leased premises with adjoining 
premises.”). 
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landowners are likely to band together and attempt to certify a class to 
maximize the impact of the litigation, especially when common patterns of 
miscalculations are alleged and/or payments under pooling agreements are 
in dispute.  Similar claims have been brought for many years, involving 
leases for vertical well drilling.8  As a result, courts will need to determine 
whether the previous analytical frameworks will apply to these new leasing 
arrangements, and if so, which of many rationales best fits this situation. 
While horizontal drilling in the various shales across the country has 
exploded and litigation related to the drilling process of the oil and gas 
interests involved has dramatically increased, courts need not reinvent the 
wheel to resolve royalty calculation or cost allocation disputes between 
lessors and lessees.  Nor must they start from scratch in determining 
whether lessors involved in horizontal drilling may bring a class action 
against a lessee.  This Article will show that, while differences may be 
necessary within leasing arrangements due to the nature of natural gas 
extraction from the shales, these differences do not alter the analysis for 
approaching class certification.9  This Article will outline the growing 
trends that entitle lessors to royalties without any deduction of production 
or transportation costs, as well as the parallel application of these principles 
to establish commonality for class certification of lessors.  Regardless of the 
differences between drilling, leases, and pooling agreements in the shale 
context, Appalachian jurisdictions are likely to hold the course and continue 
examining royalty issues and class certification of those issues as liberally 
as they have in other contexts. 
Part I of this Article will address royalty payments and cost deductions 
in state courts through the present, focusing on how courts have handled 
similar disputes in the past.  Part II of this Article will outline the general 
requirements needed to certify a class.  Part III will examine the 
commonality requirement of class certification more thoroughly, and Part 
IV will review that commonality requirement in the context of landowner 
royalty disputes.  Part V of this Article will examine how courts have 
addressed contract-based class actions.  Finally, Part VI predicts that as 
landowner royalty and cost deduction disputes arise in the context of the 
shales, courts are likely to apply the implied covenant to market against 
lessees and find commonality where leases bear similar language subjecting 
the lessee to such a covenant. 
 
 
8. See infra Parts II.E, V. 
9. See infra Parts II.E, III. 
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II. ROYALTY PAYMENTS AND COST DEDUCTIONS:  HOW WE 
GOT WHERE WE ARE 
This Article will focus on fairly specific types of lawsuits and the 
contexts in which they arise – generally, related to extraction of natural gas 
from underground formations by one party to a lease (the lessee) with the 
property’s owner (the lessor).  Prior to getting into those issues, however, it 
is essential to understand, in very general terms, the relevant property 
ownership principles, natural gas extraction techniques, recent 
technological advancements resulting in changes to those techniques, and 
how those changes may affect property rights. 
A. OWNERSHIP OF SUBSURFACE MINERALS 
Unlike virtually any other country in the world, in the United States, 
individuals (as opposed to the government) may own subsurface minerals.10  
Even in our country’s beginning, individuals have been laying claim to 
property.  Ultimately, the law developed so the owner of the surface of land 
in America also held all rights to the subsurface, straight down to the center 
of the earth.11  While the nuances of property law may vary from state to 
state, this general principle is true across the board.12  Complete ownership 
of an entire tract of property is generally known as fee simple.13 
As the years went by and less unclaimed property remained, states and 
localities began to develop methods for giving notice of ownership details 
to all others and proving ownership of real property.  Today, property 
ownership, rights, and interests are typically recorded in the office of the 
county clerk where the property lies.  These recorded interests include 
mineral leases, which notify the public that if a stated individual or entity 
owns the oil and gas interests underlying a given property, another 
individual or entity has contracted to produce the oil and gas.14 
B. HISTORY OF MINERAL EXTRACTION IN AMERICA 
For centuries before our country was formed, it was known that the 
subsurface of land contained minerals, primarily coal, oil, and gas, which 
were useful for the creation of light and energy.  By the mid-1800s, efforts 
 
10. See generally McCormick v. Union Pac. Res. Co., 14 P.3d 346, 346 (Colo. 2000). 
11. Id.  See generally Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. 
REV. 631, 684-89 (1928). 
12. C.C. Marvel, Annotation, Oil and Gas as “Minerals” Within Deed, Lease, or Licenses, 
37 A.L.R. 2D 1440, 1441-42 (1954); see also Ball, supra note 11, at 689. 
13. 31 C.J.S. Estates § 12 (2012). 
14. See generally LARRY L. SKEEN, OIL & GAS LAW OF KENTUCKY, VIRGINIA, AND WEST  
VIRGINIA §§ 3:1-3:6 (1994). 
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were underway in this country to reach and extract these underground 
minerals, using drilling and extraction techniques that have been modified 
and refined over the years.15  As those involved in mineral extraction (now 
known as producers) became more experienced, particular geographic 
regions were identified as being rich sources of oil and/or natural gas.  For 
example, mid-continent states, like Texas, Kansas, and Arkansas were areas 
found to be rich in oil, while large amounts of coal were found in 
Appalachian states, like West Virginia.  Often the fee simple owner would 
have no interest in, nor the ability to extract, any coal, oil, or gas that may 
exist on his property.  Thus, fee simple owners began severing or selling off 
various factions of their property to those better equipped to profit from 
ownership of those minerals.  As severances and changes in property 
ownership occurred, notices of ownership and rights were filed in local 
records.  As time passed, technologies for extraction of oil and natural gas 
improved, and property ownership became more and more complicated.  In 
addition, beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, the 
government began regulating natural gas development and distribution, 
among other things in the industry.16 
Originally, drilling into the subsurface to extract oil and gas simply 
went straight now into the earth, using percussion technology in the early 
1800s and progressing to rotary drilling by the mid-nineteenth century.17  
Early in the twentieth century, producers began using directional or slant 
drilling on occasions when surface use directly above the formation sought 
to be explored and produced was not consistent with placement of a well.18  
In keeping with the theory of property ownership that the fee simple tract 
went straight down to the center of the earth, directional drilling presaged 
the potential for trespass and conversion of minerals from unowned or 
unleased property.19 
This early technology allowed slant drilled wells to angle but without 
much curve.20  It could take as much as two thousand feet for a vertical 
slant well to become horizontal.  With improvements in technology, the 
 
15. Where is Crude Oil Produced, CONSUMER ENERGY REPORT, http://www.consumer 
energyreport.com/research/crude-oil/where-oil-is-produced/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
16. See The History of Regulation, NATURALGAS, http://naturalgas.org/regulation/ 
history.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
17. See Oil Drilling, SCIENCE CLARIFIED, http://www.scienceclarified.com/Mu-Oi/Oil-
Drilling html (last visited Oct. 19, 2012).  
18. See Directional and Horizontal Drilling, NATURALGAS, http://www naturalgas.org/ 
naturalgas/extraction_directional.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2012). 
19. Id.; Ball, supra note 11, 684-89. 
20. Thomas E. Stimson, Jr., Oil Drillers Throw Curves, POPULAR MECHANICS, Jan. 1950, at 
161-64. 
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curves were tightened.  Today, wellbores can more readily and quickly go 
from vertical to horizontal, allowing one well access to potentially 
thousands of acres of subsurface formations, not just those formations 
directly under the well.21 
C. OIL AND NATURAL GAS LEASES 
Leasing of oil and gas rights by producers, as opposed to the outright 
purchase of mineral estates, has become much more prevalent.  In its most 
basic sense, an oil and gas lease is a contract between the mineral owner, 
known as the lessor, who may or may not also be the surface owner, and an 
individual or entity, known as the lessee.22  Ideally, oil and gas leases 
describe and set forth all material provisions in a way which is acceptable 
and agreeable to both lessee and lessor.23  As a practical matter, however, 
this is rarely the case.24  When disputes arise between the parties to an oil 
and gas lease, the parties, and the courts, must turn to regulatory, statutory, 
and common law to fill in the gaps in resolving their disputes.25 
D. BASIC LEASE PROVISIONS 
It is impossible to include terms for all potential disputes between 
lessors and lessees.  However, following are some basic provisions found in 
most oil and gas leases.  The subsections below outline common provisions 
in mineral leases, including term, leased premises, delay rental, royalty, and 
pooling. 
1. Term 
The “term” of a lease defines the periods of time and conditions under 
which a lease remains valid.26  Most oil and gas leases have both a primary 
term and a secondary term.27  The primary term is typically a fixed number 
of years and generally requires no production or exploration activity on the 
part of the lessee for the lease to remain valid.28  On the other hand, the 
secondary term is the period following the conclusion of the primary term 
 
21. NATURALGAS, supra note 18. 
22. Douglas Hah Gross, Annotation, What Constitutes Reasonably Necessary Use at the 
Surface of the Leasehold by a Mineral Owner, Lessor, or Driller Under an Oil and Gas Lease or 
Drilling Contract, 53 A.L.R. 3D 16, 24-42 (1973). 
23. See id. 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. Awdish, supra note 7, at 69. 
27. Mohan Kelkar, The Effect of the Cessation of Production Clause During the Secondary 
Term of an Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 531, 532 (1987). 
28. Id. at 533. 
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and defines the circumstances under which the lease shall remain in force 
and effect.29  A typical term provision in an oil and gas lease may read as 
follows:  “This lease shall remain in force and effect for a [primary] term of 
– years (or months) and as long thereafter as substances covered by the 
lease are produced [secondary term].”30  Courts generally agree that if the 
condition described for taking the lease into the secondary term is not met, 
the lease expires.31 
2. Leased Premises 
The lease should contain a full and complete legal description of the 
real property that is subject to the lease.32  This description is often carried 
over from lease to lease as ownership and leasing rights change hands.33  
The description often includes metes and bounds language to help pinpoint 
the property’s boundaries.34 
3. Delay Rental 
A lessee usually need not explore or produce under a lease during its 
primary term.35  Instead, a lease often includes a provision for payment of 
delay rentals to the lessor.36  Consideration is then typically paid at the end 
of each year of the primary term in which no production has taken place.37 
4. Royalty 
Usually, the primary consideration for a lessor under an oil and gas 
lease is reservation of a royalty interest in all minerals produced under the 
lease.38  This is typically expressed as a fraction or percentage, usually 
 
29. Id. 
30. See generally Checklist for Oil/Gas/Mineral Leases, MICH. FARM BUREAU, 
http://www michfb.com/ecology/minerals (last visited Nov. 10, 2012). 
31. See generally Kelkar, supra note 27, at 532-37; see also MICH. FARM BUREAU, supra 
note 30. 
32. See generally SKEEN, supra note 14, § 3:31. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. See 55A TEX. JUR. 3D Oil and Gas § 344 (2012). 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Gas and Oil § 195 (2010).  The various definitions of royalty include: 
an agreed return paid for oil or gas reduced to possession and taken from the leased 
premises; a share of the profits or proceeds from gas and oil operations; the 
landowner’s share of production, free of the expenses of production; that fractional 
interest in the production of oil or gas created by the owner of land, either by 
reservation when the mineral lease was entered into, or by direct grant to a third 
person; payment from the lessee oil production company to the lessor-landowner for 
oil extracted from the lessor’s property; or the compensation provided in the lease for 
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between an eighth and a quarter of the price received by the lessee from sale 
of oil or gas produced.39  Disputes concerning calculation of royalty 
payments, including whether any of the post-production costs are taken 
from the reserved royalty interest, will be a major focus of this Article.40 
5. Pooling 
If the lessee anticipates combining the leased tract with other leased 
tracts for the purpose of forming a larger, single development unit, the lease 
may contain a provision defining how such “pooling” can occur, as well as 
how it will be reflected in royalty calculations.41  In addition to provisions 
in individual leases, a number of states have laws regulating pooling.42  
Pooling has become more common as horizontal drilling technology has 
developed, because horizontal drilling often requires lessees to traverse the 
mineral interests of multiple lessors.43 
This Article is most concerned with the disputes arising between 
lessors and lessees when lessees deduct post-production costs from lessor 
royalties.44  As a practical matter, because most lessees are companies that 
make the drilling of oil or natural gas their business, it would be impractical 
for each company to write and execute a new, unique lease from scratch 
with every one of its lessors.  Consequently, such companies often use form 
leases under which a significant number of the terms and provisions are 
 
the privilege of drilling for, and producing, oil and gas, and consisting of a share of the 
oil and gas produced or the profits therefrom but not a perpetual interest in the realty.  
A “royalty interest” means a property interest created in oil and gas, and its owner is 
entitled to a share of production, if, as and when there is production, free of the costs 
of production. 
Id. (citing Ramming v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 390 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2004) (referring 
to Texas law); CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Hill, 824 F. Supp. 1532 (D. Utah 1993), judgment aff’d, 
83 F.3d 431 (10th Cir. 1996); Texaco, Inc. v. Pigott, 235 F. Supp. 458 (S.D. Miss. 1964), 
judgment aff’d, 358 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1966); Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422 (Alaska 1998); 
Swaim v. Stephens Prod. Co., 196 S.W.3d 5 (Ark. 2004); Armstrong Petrol. Corp. v. Tri-Valley 
Oil & Gas Co., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); Simson v. Langholf, 293 P.2d 302 
(Colo. 1956); Hilliard v. Amoco Prod. Co., 688 So. 2d 1176 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Davis v. 
Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1963); Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, 954 P.2d 1203 (Okla. 
1998); Cartwright v. Cologne Prod. Co., 182 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App. Corpus Christi 2006)). 
39. Byron C. Keeling & Karolyn King Gillespie, The First Marketable Product Doctrine:  
Just What Is the “Product”?, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 2 (2005). 
40. See infra Parts II.E, V. 
41. Awdish, supra note 7, at 70; Oil and Gas Pooling:  How it Works and How Forced 
Pooling Affects the Owner, OIL-GAS-LEASES, http://www.oil-gas-leases.com/oil-gas-pooling.html 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
42. See generally E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Validity of Compulsory Pooling or Unitization 
Statute or Ordinance Requiring Owners or Lessees of Oil and Gas Lands to Develop Their 
Holdings as a Single Drilling Unit and the Like, 37 A.L.R. 2D 434 (1954). 
43. See generally OIL-GAS-LEASES, supra note 41. 
44. See infra Parts II.E, V. 
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exactly the same or substantially similar from lease to lease.45  In such 
leases, the royalty clauses usually include a method for calculation of the 
royalty fraction reserved; however, royalty interests are not always 
protected within the other provisions of the lease.46  In such cases, courts 
have stepped in to apply “implied covenants,” which require a lessee to 
adhere to certain obligations for marketing or producing the gas drilled.47  
An implied covenant to market generally requires a lessee to operate for the 
common good of both parties where marketable quantities of gas have been 
found.48  Often, reliance on implied covenants benefits the lessor because 
the lessee is obligated to market; therefore, post-production costs are largely 
its own responsibility.  However, even when a lessor’s royalty rights are 
protected by lease provision, implied covenant, or other circumstances, the 
lessors often feel that a lessee is not providing the proper payments and 
address this concern through litigation. 
E. ROYALTY PAYMENTS AND PRODUCTION COSTS:  THE ARGUMENT 
Regardless of lease terms and parties’ understandings of royalty 
calculations prior to drilling, disputes inevitably arise regarding:  (1) how 
royalty payments are calculated, (2) the point at which production costs 
become transmission costs, and (3) who is responsible for these expenses.  
By and large, two schools of thought have formed to assess these costs:  the 
“marketable product” rule and the “at the wellhead” rule.  How courts have 
historically assessed this calculation can affect not only the value of a 
lessor’s royalty, but also its impact on certification of a class action. 
 
45. See Assignment of Oil and Gas Leases Texas Form, MONEYINOIL, 
http://moneyinoil.com/legalform25 html last visited Oct. 21, 2012) (providing a sample oil and 
gas form). 
46. See Iams v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 45 A. 54, 55 (Pa. 1899). 
47. Id. 
48. Id.  In Iams, the following royalty clause was included in the lease: 
In consideration of said grant and demise the said party of the second part agrees to 
give or to pay to the said parties of the first part the full equal one-eighth part of all the 
oil produced or saved from the premises, and to deliver the same, free of expense, into 
tanks or pipe lines, to the credit of the first parties; and, should gas be found in 
sufficient quantities to justify marketing the same, the consideration in full to the 
parties of the first part shall be five hundred ($500) dollars per annum, payable semi-
annually in advance, for the gas from each well, so long as it shall be sold therefrom, 
and gas free of cost, for household use on the premises, to be taken from a well on 
same. 
Id. at 54.  Based on this language, a jury held that the lessee obtained sufficient quantities of gas to 
justify marketing so that, once obtained, lessee was obligated to “operate for the common good of 
both parties, and to pay the rent or royalty reserved.”  See id. at 55. 
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1. At the Wellhead 
Jurisdictions adhering to an “at the wellhead” royalty payments and 
production costs are spearheaded by Texas courts.  In essence, this rule 
grants a lessor claim to a royalty payment when gas arrives “at the 
wellhead,” at which point it is converted from real property to personal 
property.49  This means the royalty percentage is valued at the point at 
which the gas is severed from the wellhead – all costs after that point are 
post-production costs, which can be deducted from a lessor’s royalty 
payment.50  In making this determination, courts do not consider the quality 
of the product, but instead are only concerned with the location.51  While an 
implied duty to market is sometimes addressed in the sense that the lessee is 
obligated to obtain a good price, it is not the basis for the calculation 
assessment.52 
Although a significant number of courts have moved away from such a 
strict linguistic construction, a lease bearing the language “at the well” or 
“at the wellhead” warrants at least a cursory review of this calculation 
method.53  Historically, courts have placed great weight on the use of the 
language – and accordingly, more production cost responsibility – on the 
lessor.54  As shale leases are entered, a lessee using this language must 
consider whether use of “at the wellhead” language will allow them to 
apply post-production costs against royalty percentages.  Similarly, a lessee 
will have to consider whether using that language will allow it to apply 
costs against royalties in a pooling agreement, where theoretically, all 
royalties are treated equally.  Unfortunately, the trend is leading away from 
use of the “at the wellhead” rule and toward prohibiting application of post-
production costs against lessors’ royalty interest.55 
2. Marketable Product 
Jurisdictions applying the marketable product rule for royalty 
calculation rely heavily on the existence of a lessee’s implied covenant to 
market.56  In essence, this duty requires a lessee to obtain the best price 
 
49. Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 39, 2-3. 
50. Id.; Brian S. Wheeler, Deducting Post-Production Costs When Calculating Royalty:  
What Does the Lease Provide?, 8 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 5 (2008). 
51. See Keeling & Gillespie, supra note 39, at 4. 
52. See id. at 4-5. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 5. 
56. Rachel M. Kirk, Variations in the Marketable-Product Rule from State to State, 60 
OKLA. L. REV. 769, 774 (2007). 
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possible on marketable quantities of gas.57  The marketable product rule 
obligates a lessee to bear all costs incurred in making gas “marketable,” 
pursuant to this implied covenant.58  Obviously, this rule is much more 
beneficial to the lessor than to the lessee, as a lessor’s royalty will be much 
larger where costs are not applied to his retained interest.  This rule is 
followed in a number of traditional oil and gas states, notably Arkansas59 
and Kansas.60  Kansas courts have explained that the implied covenant to 
market instills a duty on the lessee to prepare the drilled gas for market.61  
Accordingly, the costs associated with that duty are also borne by the 
lessee, not the lessor.62  When applied in fact, even where royalty payments 
are to be paid at the wellhead in accordance with a lease term, the lessee 
may not deduct transportation or compression costs from that payment.63 
Of the Appalachian states, West Virginia courts have discussed this 
issue most extensively.  West Virginia has essentially prohibited any 
deductions of post-extraction costs from the lessor’s royalty payment.64  
This rule is applied very liberally and always in favor of the lessor.  As 
such, unless a lease includes an express provision that the calculation of a 
royalty payment requires the deduction of costs past the point of extraction, 
a lessor is entitled to a royalty percentage that does not reflect these 
expenses.65  And even in that case, a lessee may end up covering all costs.  
In particular, in Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC,66 a 
class action suit brought by lessors claiming insufficient royalty payments, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that “at the well” type 
phrases were not sufficient to allow lessees to shift post-production costs 
onto lessors.67  This plainly exemplifies the liberal, pro-lessor view of oil 
and gas lease analysis in Appalachia. 
It seems courts are trending toward the marketable product rule when 
assessing the validity of royalty calculations, so the prudent lessee in a shale 
 
57. Id. (citing Mittelstaedt v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 954 P.2d 1203, 1211 (Okla. 1998)). 
58. Id. at 775 (citing MAURICE H. MERRILL, COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES 
§ 85, at 214-15 (2d ed. 1940)). 
59. See generally Clear Creek Oil & Gas Co. v. Bushmiaer, 264 S.W. 830 (Ark. 1924) 
(holding the prices prevailing at the nearest place gas can be sold is market value, and the lessee 
bears the transportation and distributing charges); Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor, 759 S.W.2d 
563 (Ark. 1988) (holding lessee could not deduct costs of compressing gas for delivery). 
60. See generally Gilmore v. Superior Oil Co., 388 P.2d 602 (Kan. 1964). 
61. Id. at 606-07. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. 
64. Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22, 30 (W. Va. 2006). 
65. Wellman v. Energy Res. Inc., 557 S.E.2d 254, 265 (W. Va. 2001). 
66. 633 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 2006). 
67. Estate of Tawney, 633 S.E.2d at 30. 
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region should assume it will be held responsible for post-production costs.68  
Contractual language to the contrary may help share the burden with lessors 
in some states.  However, fact that covenants to market are being more 
readily implied demonstrates that royalty calculation decisions are trending 
in favor of lessors. 
III. CLASS CERTIFICATION 
Lessees may have multiple leases out for drilling in multiple locations 
at any given time, and courts are often asked to certify a class of lessors and 
allow uniform decision of the royalty-payment issue across that class.69  
Courts in such circumstances must determine whether such lessors and their 
claims are situated such that a class should be certified.  Certification 
requirements are relatively uniform across the oil-rich regions, but 
assessment of those requirements is not.  As companies lease more and 
more property for the purposes of horizontal drilling, courts will 
undoubtedly have to decide whether or not to certify lessor-classes claiming 
that a company has not properly issued royalty payments across the board.  
Determining how courts are likely to assess class certification motions in 
the future requires an examination of the class action certification process, 
as well as how courts have applied that process in similar situations. 
Class actions arose as a useful form of pleading because they allow a 
large group of plaintiffs to bring suit against a single person or entity with 
hopes of resolving the same or very similar concerns.70  In order to be 
certified as a class action, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as 
well as under the majority of state rules, a class must satisfy both Rule 23(a) 
and (b).71  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) states: 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if:  (1) the 
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 
 
68. Kirk, supra note 56, at 780 (explaining Wyoming, Michigan, Nevada, Arkansas, Kansas, 
Colorado, West Virginia, and Oklahoma have adopted the marketable product approach); see also 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.61503(b) (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 522.115(b) 
(West 2011); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-304 (2012). 
69. See generally SEECO v. Hales, 22 S.W.3d 157 (Ark. 2000); Shockey v. Chevron U.S.A., 
No. 98,063 (Okla. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2003) (not for publication); Duhe v. Texaco, Inc., 779 So. 2d 
1070 (La. Ct. App. 2001); John B. McArthur, The Class Action Tool in Oilfield Litigation, 45 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 113 (1996). 
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes. 
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)-(b). 
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claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.72 
The requirements of this rule are generally referred to as numerosity, 
typicality, commonality, and adequate representation.73  If a court finds that 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation have been 
met, it must then determine the type of the class.74  Under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23, there are three types: 
(b) Types of Class Actions.  A class action may be maintained if 
Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: 
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against individual class 
members would create a risk of: 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
class members that would establish incompatible standards of 
conduct for the party opposing the class; or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual class members that, as 
a practical matter, would be dispositive of the interests of the other 
members not parties to the individual adjudications or would 
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their 
interests; 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on 
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting 
the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the 
controversy.  The matters pertinent to these findings include: 
(A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; 
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the 
controversy already begun by or against class members; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation 
of the claims in the particular forum; and 
 
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (emphasis added). 
73. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997). 
74. Id. 
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(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.75 
Certification under Rule 23(b)(1) and/or (2) is typically requested when 
equitable relief – primarily, a class-wide injunction – is sought.76  When 
damages – money – are sought, certification under Rule 23(b)(3) is 
typically requested.77  Almost universally, lessors seeking class certification 
in royalty dispute actions seek money damages and thus, certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3).78 
The majority of states have based their class action legislation on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, with several adopting the relevant 
provisions in their entirety.  This includes the Appalachian states (West 
Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio), and traditional oil and gas states (Texas, 
Oklahoma, Kansas, and Arkansas).79  While courts must address all 
certification requirements when a class action motion is made, this Article 
will focus on the commonality analysis, under both Rule 23(a) and (b)(3), 
among lessors claiming improper calculation of royalty payments.  In 
essence, in order to produce the oil and gas underlying any given surface, a 
company must own or lease one hundred percent of the oil and gas interests 
underlying that property.80  Accordingly, a company is likely to have many 
leases taken out on many different tracts of land at any given time. 
In addition, a court considering a certification motion must ensure that 
the commonality between class members’ claims predominates over any 
individual claims the members may have.81  As a result, methods used by 
individual courts to determine, commonality are important.  How courts 
have handled this determination and what facts each court is willing to 
consider, play a large part in whether or not commonality is found to be 
sufficient. 
IV. THE COURT’S COMMONALITY ASSESSMENT 
Courts typically set a low threshold for finding commonality in most 
requests for class certification.82  Predominance of those common issues, at 
 
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
76. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 614-16. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See W. VA. R. CIV. P. 23(a); PA. R. CIV. P. 1702(1)-(5) (requiring that a “class action 
provides a fair and efficient method for adjudication of the controversy under the criteria set forth 
in Rule 1708” as well); OHIO R. CIV. P. 23(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(a); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 
2023.A; ARK. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
80. See SKEEN, supra note 14, § 3:7. 
81. Simpson Housing Solutions, LLC v. Hernandez, 347 S.W.3d 1, 16-16 (Ark. 2009); see 
59 AM. JUR. Parties § 73 (2012). 
82. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 627 (3d Cir. 1996). 
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least in theory, calls for a closer examination and a higher threshold.  It is 
not enough that common questions exist; rather, those common questions 
must pervade a significant aspect of the pending litigation.83  Because of 
this second step, courts often cursorily find commonality while more 
thoroughly scrutinizing predominance.84  On the other hand, to the dismay 
of the party opposing class certification, many courts will gloss over the 
predominance analysis required by Rule 23(b)(3) and simply hark back to 
its Rule 23(a) commonality findings, simply restating them in the Rule 
23(b)(3) framework.85  For example, the Appalachian states of Ohio,86 
Pennsylvania,87 and West Virginia have, for the most part, adopted Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to certify class actions in their own courts.88  
Therefore, “federal authority is an appropriate aid to interpretation of the 
Ohio rule.”89  As noted above, the commonality requirements are not 
difficult to satisfy.  “If there is a common nucleus of operative facts, or a 
common liability issue, the rule is satisfied.”90 
For example, in Pennsylvania, the common question of fact means the 
facts must be substantially the same so that proof as to one claimant would 
be proof as to all.91  But it is also a strong policy of Pennsylvania that 
decisions applying the rules for class certification should be made liberally 
and in favor of maintaining a class action.92  Likewise, West Virginia and 
Ohio have adopted the federal rule for class certification and all three states 
maintain that “‘the threshold of ‘commonality’ is not high,’ and ‘requires 
only that resolution of the common questions affect all or a substantial 
number of the class members.’”93 
Rule 23(b)(3) classes are the most frequent type requested by lessors.  
The Appalachian states thus require a prospective class to demonstrate that 
the common questions predominate – just like the federal rule.94  In 
determining whether common questions predominate, they “must represent 
 
83. Amchem Prods., Inc., 521 U.S. at 624. 
84. See generally id. 
85. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 694 N.E.2d 442, 452 (Ohio 1998). 
86. Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., 509 N.E.2d 1249, 1252 (Ohio 1987). 
87. Foodarama Supermarkets v. Am. Ins., 43 Pa. D. & C.4th 467, 495-96 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
2000). 
88. See Marks, 509 N.E.2d at 1252. 
89. Id. 
90. Hamilton, 694 N.E.2d at 452. 
91. Foodarama Supermarkets, 43 Pa. D. & C.4th at 495. 
92. Johnson v. Walsh, No. 09073504, 2011 Phila Ct. Com. Pl. LEXIS 317, at *10-11 (Pa. Ct. 
Com. Pl. Dec. 2, 2011). 
93. See, e.g., In re W. Va. Rezulin Litig. v. Hutchison, 585 S.E.2d 52, 67 (W. Va. 2003) 
(quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986)). 
94. See Schmidt v. Avco Corp., 473 N.E.2d 822, 824 (Ohio 1984). 
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a significant aspect of the case and they must be able to be resolved for all 
members of the class in a single adjudication.”95 
The existence of individual questions of fact is not fatal, but it is 
essential that there be a predominance of common issues, shared by all the 
class members, which can be justly resolved in a single proceeding.96  The 
standard for showing predominance is more demanding than that for 
demonstrating commonality, but not so strict as to vitiate the policy 
favoring certification of class actions.97  So long as a class shows that 
“adjudication of the common issues in the particular suit has important and 
desirable advantages of judicial economy compared to all other issues, or 
when viewed by themselves,” they are likely to survive certification 
scrutiny.98  In essence, the common issues need not be dispositive, as long 
as a single common issue overrides the remaining individual questions.99 
Clearly, states have relied heavily on the federal rule to certify class 
actions, including traditional oil and gas states such as Texas, Kansas, 
Oklahoma, and Arkansas.100  Many courts in oil and gas states have had the 
opportunity to assess the commonality and certify classes in property-based 
contexts.  However, the traditional oil and gas states have had significant 
opportunity to examine commonality and class certification where lessors 
claim that their royalty payments have not been properly calculated.101  
Accordingly, determining how Appalachia and other developing regions, 
such as those in North Dakota and Wisconsin, will find commonality 
between lessors claiming insufficient royalty payments in the shale context 
requires a review of how Appalachian courts and the traditional oil and gas 
states have found commonality among such lessors in the past. 
V. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF COMMONALITY ASSESSMENT IN 
LANDOWNER ROYALTY DISPUTES 
Courts have applied a variety of rules to analyze virtually identical 
commonality and predominance requirements, yet they have been unable to 
agree on a unified method for determining commonality where lessors 
allege insufficient royalties.102  Courts in the oil-rich midwest regions of the 
 
95. Id. at 825. 
96. Braun v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 24 A.3d 875, 894 (Pa. 2011); Perrine v. E.I. DuPont De 
Nemours & Co., 694 S.E.2d 815, 859 (W. Va. 2010). 
97. Rezulin, 585 S.E.2d at 67. 
98. Id. at 72. 
99. See id. 
100. See generally Kirk, supra note 56. 
101. See, e.g., cases cited infra Part V. 
102. See infra Part V.A-C. 
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United States have explored multiple frameworks for determining 
commonality and predominance in these landowner-royalty cases.103  
Interestingly, courts relying on “at the wellhead” determinations of royalty 
payments have often relied on the express language of a lease to determine 
commonality.104  Other courts, relying more heavily on the marketable 
product rule to calculate royalty payments and cost-allocation, are more apt 
to use the existence of any common implied covenants within the putative 
class members’ leases.105  Increasingly though, courts are taking a more 
liberal hybrid approach, applying virtually any available facts to find that 
commonality exists.106 
As drilling in the shale regions expands, so has related litigation.  
Accordingly, it stands to reason that lessors in the shale-laden states will 
increasingly inquire into the validity of royalty calculations.  As is the case 
in other claims when class certification has been assessed, the states are 
likely to follow jurisdictional precedent.  That review demonstrates that a 
court’s assessment of commonality is often in-line with how that court 
decides the substantive issue of royalty calculations – examining express 
lease provisions or applying implied covenants in a broader way. 
A. COMMONALITY IN THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF A LEASE 
When courts are faced with class certification motions from lessors 
claiming improper royalty calculations, some tend to look to the specific 
lease provisions that include calculation of costs “at the wellhead” or other 
similar language.107  For example, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Arkansas denied class certification based on the express 
language of lease provisions.108  In Riedel v. XTO Energy, Inc.,109 the court 
noted that individualized inquiries into the leases were necessary in order to 
determine whether the agreements were common form contracts.110  
Although the plaintiffs had issues in common, those common questions did 
not predominate over individual issues based on the express terms of the 
contracts.111  In contrast, the Supreme Court of Kansas examined the 
express language of royalty provisions in various leases, in conjunction 
 
103. See infra Part V.A-C. 
104. See infra Part V.A. 
105. See infra Part V.B. 
106. See infra Part V.C. 
107. See generally Riedel v. XTO Energy, Inc., 257 F.R.D. 494 (E.D. Ark. 2009). 
108. Id. at 496. 
109. 257 F.R.D. 494 (E.D. Ark. 2009). 
110. See generally Riedel, 257 F.R.D. at 512-13. 
111. Id. 
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with the defendant gas company’s treatment of those royalty provisions, to 
find commonality among lessors in Waechter v. Amoco Production Co.112 
In Tana Oil & Gas Corp. v. Bates,113 the Court of Appeals of Texas 
certified a class based on identical lease language concerning payment of 
royalties on gas production.114  The foregoing analysis has been applied to 
class certification motions for suits over royalty disputes from deep drilling, 
rather than horizontal drilling, because lease language tends to be form-
based.115  Similar language used across the land is bound to affect a 
commonality determination, especially where the issue at hand is addressed 
expressly in each lease.  Interestingly, this Texas court used express lease 
provisions to find commonality, just as it used the same express provision 
to calculate the royalty substantively.116 
B. USE OF IMPLIED COVENANTS TO ASSESS COMMONALITY 
In contrast with those examining the express royalty terms of a lease, 
some courts use the presence of implied covenants to find predominant, 
common issues between oil and gas lessors.  These courts often coincide 
with those that apply the marketable product rule to the substantive claims 
for insufficient royalties.  Under this view, courts often rely on the fact that 
a defendant gas company is subject to an implied covenant to market to find 
that all lessors claiming improper royalty payments have sufficiently 
common issues to certify a class.117 
For example, the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed certification of a 
class based on an implied covenant to market in Farrar v. Mobil Oil 
Corp.118  Specifically, the court held: 
in a purported class action claiming improper calculation of 
royalties, there is no need to examine individual lease formation 
and the intent of the parties thereto for purposes of determining 
predominance of common issues or manageability in certification 
proceedings where there has been shown a systematic common 
course of conduct by an oil and gas lessee in calculating royalties 
payable.119 
 
112. 537 P.2d 228, 245 (Kan. 1975). 
113. 978 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App. 1998). 
114. Tana Oil & Gas Co., 978 S.W.2d at 738, 742. 
115. See id. at 741-42. 
116. Id. 
117. Smith v. Amoco Prod. Co., 31 P.3d 255 (Kan. 2001). 
118. 234 P.3d 19 (Kan. 2010). 
119. Farrar, 234 P.3d at 31. 
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Being one of the states that have traditionally calculated royalties based on 
the marketable product rule, Kansas kept its commonality assessment in 
line with its substantive analysis.120 
Similarly, the New Mexico Supreme Court upheld certification of a 
class based solely on the existence of an implied duty of marketability.121  
In Davis v. Devon Energy Corp.,122 the court held that when such a duty is 
implied in law, it does not require reliance on individualized evidence of the 
parties’ express agreements and thus provides sufficient commonality to 
certify a class.123  Again, the existence of implied responsibility was 
sufficient to connect the leases as a class.124 
Courts have even used the existence of implied covenants to deny 
certification of a class.125  In Stirman v. Exxon Corp.,126 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
certification of a class based on an implied covenant to market.127  The 
district court had found commonality based on the “reasonably prudent 
operator standard” of the implied covenant to market.128  However, the Fifth 
Circuit held the class certification order was an abuse of discretion because 
the law regarding implied covenants to market was not uniform across the 
jurisdictions involved in the case.129  That lack of uniformity created 
individual issues that predominated over common issues. 
C. A HYBRID EXAMINATION:  EXPRESS LANGUAGE 
 AND IMPLIED COVENANTS 
While some certification decisions have been made by depending 
solely on the express language of the leases and others have been made by 
focusing specifically on the existence of an implied covenant, still other 
courts have applied hybrid methods.  These courts tend to assess and 
consider a variety of approaches taken by courts in drill-heavy regions to 
determine whether or not a class of lessors should be certified.  
Accordingly, they end up applying a myriad of methods to certify a class.  
These hybrids demonstrate that, where a court is liberally approaching class 
 
120. See id. 
121. Davis v. Devon Energy Corp., 218 P.3d 75, 84-87 (N.M. 2009). 
122. 218 P.3d 75 (N.M. 2009). 
123. Davis, 218 P.3d at 84-87. 
124. Id. 
125. See, e.g., Stirman v. Exxon Corp., 280 F.3d 554, 566 (5th Cir. 2002). 
126. 280 F.3d 554 (5th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added). 
127. Stirman, 280 F.3d at 556. 
128. Id. at 559-60 (quoting Feb. 22, 2001 Order at 2, Sitrman v. Exxon, 280 F.3d 544 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (No. SA-99-CA-0763)). 
129. Id. at 566. 
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certification, it tends to examine any means possible of finding common 
predominant issues. 
For example, the Supreme Court of Texas has expanded beyond its 
own express-language view to consider implied covenants as well.130  In 
Bowden v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,131 the Texas Supreme Court denied 
certification of one class based on a duty to market because some leases 
contained express clauses as to the duty to market, and some did not.132  
The Bowden court also denied certification to a second class based on 
reasonableness of fees under “percentage of the proceeds” contracts, 
because the class included both proceeds and market value leases.133  The 
royalty owners asserted that the contracts established a duty to administer 
the lease as a reasonably prudent operator under both lease forms, but the 
court held that “market value leases provide an objective basis for 
calculating royalties independent of the price the lessee actually obtains,” 
while proceeds leases relied on implied covenants, so commonality was 
lacking.134  However, the Bowden court did agree to certify a third class 
based on the uniform language of pricing provisions in Gas Royalty 
Agreements.135 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed class certification 
based on the defendant’s course of conduct in allegedly defrauding the class 
members.136  In SEECO, Inc. v. Hales,137 certification was not expressly 
based on contract language or implied covenants, but the court did confirm 
that individual differences in the language of the leases were not sufficient 
to override the common scheme or prevent class certification.138  The court 
noted that its order would not eliminate the need for each class member to 
show reliance on the alleged fraud.139  However, the alleged fraudulent 
scheme of the defendant constituted a “single course of fraudulent 
conduct,” which served as a common starting point for the claims of all 
class members.140 
 
130. Bowden v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 247 S.W.3d 690, 708-09 (Tex. 2008). 
131. 247 S.W.3d 690 (Tex. 2008). 
132. Bowden, 247 S.W.3d at 690, 708-09. 
133. Id. at 694-95. 
134. Id. at 707, 709. 
135. Id. at 702-08. 
136. SEECO, Inc. v. Hales, 954 S.W.2d 234, 240-41 (Ark. 1997). 
137. 954 S.W.2d 234 (Ark. 1997). 
138. SEECO, Inc., 954 S.W.2d at 237 (“The evidence produced by the plaintiffs indicates:  
an alleged overall scheme and course of conduct by the defendants designed to defraud the 
members of the proposed class as a group irrespective of the type of oil and gas lease or the 
volume of production from the leases.”). 
139. Id. at 240-41. 
140. Id. 
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Undoubtedly, when a class certification request is brought before a 
court, a lessee will struggle to know exactly what factors may play into the 
determinations of commonality and predominance, even in the face of these 
three approaches.  In one instance, the specific language used in the express 
terms of each lease may be reviewed and, if the language used to calculate 
royalty payments is sufficiently similar, a court may find a common 
question that predominates over any individual payment issues.141  In 
another instance, a court may ignore express language and instead 
determine whether, in that jurisdiction, the lessee was subject to an implied 
duty to market the gas produced such that all lessors’ improper royalty 
claims are common and can be considered together.142  In still other 
situations, the court may justify examination of both express terms of the 
lease and any existing implied covenants.143 
However, while all of these options exist, it is apparent that these 
trends tend to coincide with a jurisdiction’s method of determining the 
substantive royalty calculations claims.  Accordingly, courts likely will 
apply similar logic to substantive royalty claims and commonality for class 
certification of those claims in Appalachian shale leases.  However, before 
concluding how courts are likely to rule, it is also helpful to consider how 
those courts have addressed commonality in a similar arena – that of 
general contract-based claims – to determine whether a greater trend exists. 
VI. CONTRACT-BASED CLASS ACTIONS 
When asked to certify a class in cases involving breach of contract 
claims, Appalachian courts will often maintain a low threshold for 
commonality and even cede its existence, where the contracts are 
substantially the same.144  Specifically, “[c]laims arising from 
interpretations of a form contract generally give rise to common 
questions.”145  Moreover, “[c]ourts . . . generally find that a wide variety of 
claims may be established by common proof in cases involving similar 
form documents or the use of standardized procedures and practices.”146 
The inclination to find predominance of common issues in standard-
form contract cases was reiterated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 
 
141. See discussion supra Part V.A. 
142. See discussion supra Part V.B. 
143. See discussion supra Part V.C. 
144. Dearlove v. Genzyme Transgenics Corp., 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 314, 324 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 
2004); Shaver v. Standard Oil Co., 623 N.E.2d 602, 605 (Ohio App. 1993) (“By providing 
standardized lease agreements which were uniformly imposed on the dealers by [the lessee, 
appellants meet] the threshold requirement of commonality.”). 
145. Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 457 (Pa. 1982). 
146. Cope v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 696 N.E.2d 1001, 1004 (Ohio 1998). 
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Hamilton v. Ohio Savings Bank.147  In Hamilton, the Supreme Court of 
Ohio held that a “class action . . . is appropriate where the claims arise from 
standardized forms or routinized procedures, notwithstanding the need to 
prove reliance.”148  Thus, there is a likelihood that commonality in proposed 
classes where identical contracts are at issue will be found.149  But disparate 
contracts will not necessarily preclude class certification, provided that the 
underlying legal issues are substantially the same or where similar practices 
are used.150 
When one Ohio trial court denied a motion for class certification based 
upon a finding that predominant commonality was lacking due to differing 
contracts, the Court of Appeals of Ohio found an abuse of discretion and 
certified the class.151  “Although [appellee] used different contracts, there 
was clearly a ‘common nucleus of fact.’”152  The Hadley court emphasized 
a preference to grant commonality liberally by certifying the proposed 
class, even where individual contracts contained certain discrete terms.153  
Likewise, Pennsylvania courts have found commonality based on different 
contracts so long as “the relevant contractual provisions raise common 
questions of law and fact and do not differ materially.”154  West Virginia 
has followed similar principles, stating “a common nucleus of operative fact 
or law is usually enough to satisfy the commonality requirement.”155 
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has also stated that 
proposed class members must present evidence that the terms of the alleged 
contract were ascertainable and definitive in nature.156  In cases where later 
refinement of the issues reveals that seemingly similar contractual 
provisions merit differing interpretations, the court may create appropriate 
subclasses.157  However, these subclasses do not defeat the original 
determination that commonality is present. 
When applied to lessor class actions for insufficient royalty payments, 
these liberal decisions imply that other courts would find commonality just 
as easily in lease contracts.  Even in contract-based claims regarding 
 
147. 694 N.E.2d 442, 452 (Ohio 1998). 
148. Hamilton, 694 N.E.2d at 456. 
149. See id. 
150. See generally Estate of Reed v. Hadley, 839 N.E.2d 55, 62 (Ohio App. 2005). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 62-63. 
154. Dearlove v. Genzyme Transgenics Corp., 70 Pa. D. & C.4th 314, 324 (Pa. Ct. Cm. Pl. 
2004) (citing Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 457 (Pa. 1982)). 
155. State of W. Va. ex rel. Chemtall Inc. v. Madden, 607 S.E.2d 772, 781 (W. Va. 2004). 
156. Ways v. Imation Enters. Corp., 589 S.E.2d 36, 43 (W. Va. 2003). 
157. Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 457 (Pa. 1982). 
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different individual contracts, these courts have consistently found that, so 
long as there is a common nucleus of operative fact, this prerequisite is 
easily satisfied.158  When this liberality is considered alongside the growing 
trend to find commonality in property-based lessor class actions, it seems 
clear that shale lessees should expect similar treatment from courts.159 
As noted earlier, Rule 23(b)(3) requires putative class members to 
demonstrate that the questions of law or fact common to the class 
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.160  
While Appalachian courts will allow a permissive application of 
commonality in breach of contract claims, sporadically this same group of 
courts will set a higher threshold for predominance in those same 
scenarios.161  In Ohio, standardized contracts have been a strong indicator 
of commonality.  Differing contracts have warranted evidence of a common 
nucleus of operative fact, but the predominance requirement is construed 
more narrowly.  In Hinkston v. Sunstar Acceptance Corp.,162 the Court of 
Appeals of Ohio held that where “each transaction is different, depending 
on such things as the business practice of [the seller] and the customer’s 
ability to negotiate, an individual inquiry into each transaction is 
necessary.”163  The Hinkston court concluded that predominance was not 
met, because questions affecting individual class members predominated 
over common questions.164 
Importantly, the mere existence of differing forms of contracts does not 
defeat predominance without any indication as to the materiality of any 
differences.165  When answering the predominance question in a contract-
based certification motion, courts often examine each of the contracts in 
question and determine whether the common elements of the contracts are 
more pervasive than the differences.166  The existence of boilerplate 
language in these contracts is also used to establish predominance of 
 
158. See Chemtall, 607 S.E.2d at 781. 
159. Compare Part V.A-C, with Part VI. 
160. See generally Kirk, supra note 56. 
161. See supra Part IV. 
162. Nos. C-990681, C-990701, 2000 WL 1886388 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2000). 
163. Hinkston, 2000 WL 1886388, at *16. 
164. Id. 
165. Estate of Reed v. Hadley, 839 N.E.2d 55, 64 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
166. Id. at 64 (“[A] claim will meet the predominance requirements when there exists a 
generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, 
since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member’s individual position.” (citation 
omitted)); Janicik v. Prudential Ins. Co., 451 A.2d 451, 456 (Pa. 1982) (“[C]lass actions may be 
maintained even when the claims of members are based on different contracts so long as the 
relevant contractual provisions raise common questions of law and fact and do not differ 
materially.” (citation omitted)). 
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common issues in courts.167  In essence, to determine that “class 
certification is improper simply because members of the proposed class 
signed different contracts” is considered an erroneous analysis.168 
Although some differing language is used in the respective rules for 
class action certification and maintenance across the Appalachian states, 
these courts actually address the issue in somewhat similar fashions.  In 
each state, commonality bears a low threshold, often meriting only a 
cursory glance to acknowledge that at least a single common question of 
law and fact exists among the members of the proposed class.169  This is 
especially true in cases where there is a single form contract, although 
disparate contracts do not necessarily preclude certification so long as they 
are fundamentally similar.170  The consideration for predominance is 
generally stricter than that for commonality, yet not applied in a 
comfortably consistent manner across, or even within, the states.  Provided 
that one or more of the claims at issue stem from a “common nucleus of 
operative fact,” courts will often maintain classes in the interest of efficient 
adjudication.171 
VII. COMMONALITY FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION IN 
LANDOWNER ROYALTY DISPUTES 
While review of class certification trends demonstrates that states 
largely apply the same rules and requirements as Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 to certify a class, how those jurisdictions go about supporting 
the existence of each requirement is not so uniform.  The methods by which 
these jurisdictions choose to analyze the common issues at play in any 
given class action are not consistent, and they generally depend on how a 
court would assess the substantive royalty claim underlying the certification 
request.  Accordingly, a party should examine how the courts may calculate 
royalties to determine whether it is likely to certify a class.  Moreover, 
parties may take hints from the way other contract-based claims have been 
handled. 
In the growing context of horizontal drilling, whether or not a pooling 
agreement exists, all evidence points to the likelihood that courts will apply 
 
167. See State ex rel. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Starcher, 474 S.E.2d 186, 189 (W. Va. 1996) 
(“[T]he breach of contract claim . . . [is] based upon proof of the standard form documents utilized 
by the defendant in its processing . . . and the standardized rules, procedures and conduct of the 
defendant in handling these matters.”). 
168. Hadley, 839 N.E.2d at 66. 
169. See supra Part IV. 
170. See, e.g., Hadley, 839 N.E.2d at 64. 
171. See State of W. Va. ex rel. Chemtall, 607 S.E.2d, 722, 781 (W. Va. 2004). 
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the implied covenant to market against any lessee and find that all leases 
bearing similar language under which the lessee is subject to this covenant 
will have common issues.  Additionally, these trends show that while 
predominance of those common issues can be hard to establish, it is not 
impossible.  Moreover, the rigor a court may employ in assessing 
predominance in any particular case cannot be comfortably predicted.  
Where pooling agreements exist to link lessors, however, it may be more 
easily established. 
The growing trend in royalty calculation assessment leans toward use 
of the marketable product rule.172  Impliedly, this means, as long as the 
implied covenant to market is applicable, lessees will be required to pay 
royalties without deductions for production and transportation costs, 
regardless of differences in leasing and pooling structures in horizontal 
drilling.  States like West Virginia have not only adopted the marketable 
product rule, they have made it expressly clear that lessees are not able to 
transfer the costs of production or transportation onto lessors, regardless of 
the inclusion of “at the wellhead” language in any given lease provision.173  
The fact that such adamant holdings exist demonstrates that implied 
covenants and other surrounding circumstances will play a large part in 
commonality determinations for class certification as well. 
As courts in the shale regions face more and more putative class 
actions for claims of improper royalty payments, they will have a plethora 
of information to ponder in determining whether or not the lessors bring 
common, predominant claims to the table.  They will be able to review 
traditional methods of examining royalty calculation claims from traditional 
oil and gas states, as well as in other shale regions.  They will have the 
opportunity to consider express terms and provisions included in their 
leases, as well as the existence of any implied covenants underlying each 
lease.  Additionally, they will be able to compare property-based class 
action requests with those that are contract-based.  This review 
demonstrates that while a variety of methods have been applied in the past, 
a clear trend is forming: courts are construing commonality and 
predominance liberally and using far reaching information to certify a class, 
rather than restrict their review to specific, narrow facts. 
In the context of property-based royalty payment claims, courts are 
considering express language, implied covenants, and other surrounding 
circumstances, rather than adhering only to an examination of express terms 
of a lease or only applying covenants implied in law.  Where commonality 
 
172. See supra Part V. 
173. See Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Res., LLC, 633 S.E.2d 22, 30 (W. Va. 2006). 
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exists between the express language of a royalty term, such as a calculation 
made “at the wellhead,” courts are often willing to certify classes as long as 
this language constitutes a predominant, common nucleus of operative fact 
within the lessors’ claims.174  Certification also occurs where predominant 
commonality exists because the lessee is subject to implied covenants to 
market or produce the gas drilled from the lessors’ property.175  This 
indicates that as the Appalachian shale region continues to develop, lessors 
filing suit, who are bound by form leases containing identical or 
substantially similar royalty clauses, are likely to be certified as a class.  It 
also shows that where the lessees are obligated to market or produce the gas 
drilled as implied by law, lessors claiming that their royalties are calculated 
incorrectly will be able to certify a class, regardless of lease language.  
Certification may be met at an even lower threshold when the common 
leases also contain pooling agreements, because it can be argued that the 
lessee has essentially created a contract establishing commonality between 
those specific lessors.176  And as review of contract-based class actions 
shows, courts are willing to certify where terms are merely similar, rather 
than identical.177 
In those contract-based claims, commonality is also found on the basis 
of party’s duty or prior practices.178  Admittedly, property-based claims are 
not always handled the same as the contract-based claims even though a 
lease is a form of contract.179  However, the fact that courts are handling 
both genres with similar liberality demonstrates that they are not likely to 
except shale or other horizontal drilling leases from this trend.  
Accordingly, a lessee should expect that if lessors bring a claim for 
improper royalty calculations as a class action, the existence of form royalty 
provisions, pooling agreements, standard protocols for issuing royalty 
payments, as well as statutory and common law covenants, can all be used 
to establish a class. 
VIII.CONCLUSION 
This Article has reviewed general principles of oil and gas leases, as 
well as the legal theories applied to royalty calculations.  The Article has 
also examined how courts have traditionally certified a class of lessors 
alleging insufficient royalty payments and how that process may mirror or 
 
174. See supra Part V.A. 
175. See supra Part V.B. 
176. See supra Part II.D.5. 
177. See Part VI. 
178. See Part VI. 
179. Compare Part V, with Part VI. 
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differ from the certification of other contract-based claims.  Most 
importantly, this Article has demonstrated that when all of these factors are 
considered, courts are likely to apply the same principles to certify a lessor 
class in shale royalty disputes, regardless of the differences that the 
horizontal drilling form presents. 
Shale drilling methods differ significantly from past drilling methods 
and have the potential to reach many mineral interest owners from a single 
well pad.  Also, the use of pooling agreements is more prevalent, unifying 
lessors even more than in the past.  In conjunction with growing trends that 
apply the marketable product rule and liberally construe the commonality 
requirement of class certification, there can be no doubt that a lessee will 
need to construe its royalty payment just as it has in the past.  Technology 
may have evolved to benefit production, but this evolution is unlikely to 
affect the percentages owed or the costs allocated to the average lessor upon 
production. 
